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UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER: MAKING
THE NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT MORE
EQUITABLE
The same ritual occurs every year. Coaches travel all over the country in
hopes of recruiting a star athlete that can help their program achieve success.
Prospective student-athletes travel to various campuses to decide which
institution's program will be the best fit for them. They speak to current
players, students, and coaches - all of whom tell them this institution is the
best place for them to be next fall. The coach shows off some new or storied
athletic facility and the great accommodations for athletes. The coach
promises them the world: that over the next four or five years they will
become a star, be ready for the pros, or get into the academic program they
want. The culmination of this ritual is the commitment of the prospect to the
institution through the signing of the National Letter of Intent (NLI) and the
scholarship letter. 1 Generally, both the institution and the prospect benefit
from this relationship, but sometimes something else happens. The promises
do not come true, the athlete does not play, or the coach leaves the institution.
In almost all of these cases, there is little the athlete can do about the situation.
This comment will explore why those situations happen and what the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) can do to help student-athletes.
I. THE NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT PROGRAM

The NLI is an agreement between the institution and the prospect that the
prospect will attend that institution for one year and will be provided with a
financial aid award. 2 The NLI system began in 1964 and has undergone
extensive changes since then.3 At that time, the program was used by seven
conferences and eight independent institutions. 4 Currently, the NLI is used by
fifty-seven conferences and over five hundred institutions to offer athletic

1. COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, TEXT OF THE NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT,

NATIONAL-LETTER.ORG, at http://www.national-letter.org/guidelines/nli-text.php (last visited Nov.
23, 2004) [hereinafter NLI Text].
2. Id.
3.

COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, OVERVIEW: WHAT IS THE NLI?, NATIONAL-

LETTER.ORG, at http://www.national-letter.org/overview/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter NLI
Overview].

4. Id.
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scholarships. 5 The program is used by all schools except those institutions that
do not offer athletic scholarships: the Ivy League, the Patriot League, and the
service academies. 6 Since its inception, the program has been run by the
Collegiate Commissioners Association (CCA), not by the NCAA. 7 The CCA
has operated out of the Southeastern Conference (SEC) since 1995.8
The original Letter of Intent was designed with the same goals in mind as
today's program: "[t]o reduce and limit recruiting pressure on student-athletes;
and [t]o promote and preserve the amateur nature of collegiate athletics." 9 In
1964, the Letter of Intent was two pages and did not deal with the needs of all
sports.' 0 The CCA amended the NLI in 1973 in response to its growing use by
conferences and institutions and to accommodate the various sports
involved. 1 The NLI finally expanded to its current four-page format in
1991.12 The current format combines men's and women's sports and the rules
and interpretations into one document. 13 The NLI is sent out to recruits from
the institution along with the athletics financial aid award during one of the

signing periods. 14 There are two signing periods for every sport with the
exception of field hockey, soccer, and men's water polo. 15 All other sports
operate with an early signing period in November and a late signing period
beginning in April. 16 Letters of Intent may be signed only during these
periods; otherwise, they are not valid. 17 The prospect has either the length of
the early signing period or fourteen days from issuance of the NLI to sign the
NLI or it expires. 18 Once the prospect signs the NLI, he or she is bound to that
institution, the recruiting process ceases, and all other institutions are barred
5. COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, MEMBER CONFERENCES, NATIONALLETTER.ORG, at http://www.national-letter.org/conferences/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter
NLI Conferences].
6. Pete Diprimio, National Letters of Intent Under Fire, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 13,
2003, at D12.
7. COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, HISTORY OF THE NLI, NATIONAL-LETTER.ORG,
at http://www.national-letter.org/history/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter NLI History].
8. Id.
9. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
10. NLI History, supra note 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. NLI Text, supra note 1.
15. COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, SIGNING DATES, NATIONAL-LETTER.ORG, at
http://www.national-letter.org/dates/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter NLI Signing Dates].

16. Id
17. Id.
18. NLI Text, supra note 1.
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from contacting or recruiting the prospect. 19 The prospect is then bound to the
institution for a period of one year and must end all his or her recruiting
contacts with other universities.
The end of the recruiting process with the signing of the NLI binds the
institution and the recruit through a bilateral contract, which has a duration of
one year. 20 In the case of the prospect-institution relationship, the contract
documents are the NLI and accompanying athletics financial aid award. 2 1 The
NLI and athletics financial aid award meet the basic criteria of a contract,
22
which are that there is an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.
The institution begins the process by making the offer to the prospect in
the form of a scholarship. 23 This scholarship must be an athletics award to
attend the institution and is required 24 because the language contained in the
NLI states that alone it is not a contract; it requires the offer of athletics
financial aid. 25 The NLI is not a scholarship offer, but the athlete is told that
"[a]t the time I sign this NLI, I must receive a written offer of athletics
financial aid ....The offer shall list the terms and conditions of the award,
including the amount and duration of the financial aid." 26 Thus, without the
financial aid award, the contract is not complete. 27 The acceptance is the
signing of the NLI by the prospect and his or her legal parent or guardian
28
during the proscribed period and sending the documents to the institution.
Finally, the signing of the NLI meets the test for consideration. 29
Consideration between the prospect and the institution occurs first from the
institution's point-of-view. 30 The institution must suffer a legal detriment: it
must give up something that induces the prospect's promise'to attend the
university. 3 1 In this case, the university is providing athletic financial aid that
it does not have to provide, which also prevents it from giving an athletic
19. Id.
20. Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent: A
Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1287-1310 (1989). This article provides an
in-depth analysis of the NLI as a contract.
21. Id. at 1312.
22. Id.at 1293-1310.
23. Id.at 1311-16.
24. NLI Text, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id
Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1312.
Id.at 1316-20. See also NLI Text, supra note 1.
Cozzillio, supra note 20, at 1338.

30. Id.at 1339.

31. Id.
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award to another prospect. 32 Second, the acceptance is made because of the
detriment; here, the prospect is induced to sign because of the financial
award. 33 Finally, the promise by the prospect to attend induces the institution's
detriment of giving the scholarship. 34 From the prospect's side, consideration
occurs because the student is under no obligation to otherwise attend the
institution and attendance at that institution prevents the student from
attending another. 35 Second, the prospect's detriment induces the institution's
promise to give an athletic award. 36 Finally, the prospect knowingly accepts
37
the offer made by the institution, satisfying the third prong of consideration.
With an offer, acceptance, and consideration, the NLI and athletics award
constitute a valid contract.
The courts have generally accepted that student-athletes and universities
do have a contractual relationship. 38 In Jackson v. Drake University, the court
found that "[t]he financial aid agreements entered into by [the recruit]
constitute valid contracts." 39 The contractual agreement is for one year and
consists of the NLI and the scholarship agreement from the institution. The
NLI text also contains the terms under which the NLI is signed and the
obligations of both the institution and the prospect. 40 The only obligations of
the university are to properly file the paperwork and to provide the
accompanying "written offer of athletics financial aid."4 1 The remainder of the
NLI deals with the obligations of and restrictions on the student-athlete. 42 The
prospect is obligated to attend the university for one year, but the NLI does not
deal at all with his or her participation in athletics. 43 The scholarship
agreement contains the remaining terms included in the contract, including the
length and the clause that all institution and conference rules must be
followed. 44 This contract contains no additional terms regarding the promises

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id..
35. Id. at 1340.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1992); Ross v. Creighton
Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 415-17 (7th Cir. 1992).
39. Jackson, 778 F. Supp. at 1493.
40. NLI Text, supra note 1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
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45
made by a coach or university during the recruiting process.

II. Do ORAL PROMISES MEAN ANYTHING?
There have been instances of athletes suing the institution, claiming that
promises made by the coach or the university during the recruiting process
were a contract and were breached. One prominent case was that of Brian
Fortay. In 1993, Fortay sued the University of Miami for breach of contract,
among other claims. 46 He claimed that he signed his NLI and scholarship offer
because of the promises he alleged the coach made: that he would be the
47
starting quarterback and the football team would be built around him.
Shortly after he signed, the coach who had recruited him, Jimmy Johnson, left
and was replaced by Dennis Erickson. 48 Fortay claimed that the new coach
persuaded him to stay at Miami by assuring him that he would be the starter in
a "system better suited for entry into the NFL."'49 Miami also refused to release
Fortay from his letter of intent; therefore, transferring would have cost him
two years of eligibility. 50 After Fortay enrolled at Miami, he "red-shirted" for
two years and then became a backup. 5 1 Eventually, Fortay chose to transfer to
Rutgers and lose a year of eligibility rather than remain as a backup at Miami
behind a quarterback he had outperformed in competitions. 52 In 1996, Fortay
53
and Miami settled the case out of court.
Since Fortay and Miami chose to settle out of court rather than continue
with litigation, it is not clear if he would have prevailed on any of his claims.
It is, however, a classic example of the kinds of promises coaches make to
prospects during the recruiting process. Most of these cases do not make it to
court or do not become of huge media interest. The only ones harmed in this
process are the athletes. If the athlete does not bring the issue to court, the
institution loses nothing. If the athlete stays, the school is not bound to

45. Id.
46. Fortay v. Univ. of Miami, CIV. A. No. 93-3443, 1994 WL 62319, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 17,
1994).
47. Id.at *4.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.See also NLI Text, supra note 1.
51. Fortay, 1994 WL 62319, at *4-5.
52. Id. at *5.
53. James Kennedy Omstein, Comment, Broken Promises and Broken Dreams: Should We Hold
College Athletic ProgramsAccountable for Breaching Representations Made in Recruiting StudentAthletes?, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 641, 642 (1996).
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continue giving him or her a scholarship after the first year.54 If the athlete
transfers, the coach no longer has to deal with an unhappy player and has an
additional scholarship to give. 55 In the case of Fortay, the 1991 Miami team
went on to win the national championship. 56 The quarterback who replaced
him, Gino Torretta, went on to win the Heisman Trophy in 199257 and was
58
drafted by the Minnesota Vikings in the 1993 NFL Draft.
One reason Fortay might have wished to settle is that no guarantees are
given if the prospect meets the requirements of the NLI, other than the one59
year scholarship award.
The NLI is a binding agreement between a prospective athlete and an
institution in which the athlete agrees to attend the institution for one full
academic year in exchange for athletic financial aid for that year .... The NLI
does not guarantee the athlete a place on the sports team, nor does it guarantee
60
playing time.
That is all the NLI is - an agreement that the institution will provide
financial aid so long as the athlete attends the institution for the full academic
year. 6 1 There are no promises of starting or of building the team around one
player, and there are no promises that the player will even get to play or that
62
the recruit can be built into a professional caliber player.
The courts have been unwilling to read any protected interests into the
agreements other than the financial interest in a one-year scholarship. 63 The
institution is obligated to provide the financial aid offered in the financial
54. NCAA rules require that scholarships only be for one year and renewable for up to five years.
The institution may not renew the scholarship so long as written notice is given to the athlete on or
before July 1 prior to the academic year. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 200304 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 201-03, Bylaws 15.3.3-15.3.5 (2003) [hereinafter DIVISION I
MANUAL].
55. Id.
56. University of Miami, 1991 (12-0-0): Gino, the Ruthless Posse and Wide Right I,
COLLEGESPORTS.COM,
at
http://hurricanesports.collegesports.com/sports/m-footbl/archive/
043002aae.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
57. College
Sports
Online,
Heisman
Winners,
COLLEGESPORTS.COM,
at
http://heisman.collegesports.com/winners/hsmn-winners.html#winners-year (last visited Nov. 23,
2004).
58. National
Football
League,
1993
NFL
Draft,
NFL.COM,
at
http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/years/1993 (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
59. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
60. Michael J. Riella, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying the Doctrines of
Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent Under the National
Letter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2181, 2186-87 (2002).
61. Id. at 2187.
62. See Hysaw v. Washburn Univ., 690 F. Supp. 940, 946-47 (D. Kan. 1987).
63. See id.
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64
award, and the recruit is obligated to attend the institution for one year.
Beyond that, the courts have found that the recruit has no property or protected
interests. 65 In Hysaw v. Washburn University, the plaintiffs sued because they
were denied the right to play football after they boycotted practice in protest of
what they felt were unaddressed concerns about discriminatory treatment of
black players. 66 The plaintiffs claimed that their right to play football was
denied by Washburn and the coaching staff, and that this denial deprived them
of a protected interest. 67 They claimed this right was protected through the
scholarship documents they had signed. 68 The court determined that while
they did have a property right in the scholarship, there was no protected
interest in playing football. 69 The court said, "[a]ny other terms plaintiffs
attempt to read into those agreements are, without supporting evidence, no
more than 'unilateral expectations.' 70 The court found that playing time was
too speculative an interest to be protected. 7 1 While the players may have
expected they would play, their scholarship documents contained no promise
of this. 72 Thus, while the institution could not take away the scholarship it had
promised in the award letter, there is no protected right for prospects to play or
to even be on the team.
Likewise, because interpretation of the NLI is based on contract law,
courts have been very unwilling to find any additional, unwritten promises in
the contract. In Hysaw, the plaintiffs argued that besides a protected interest,
Washburn had breached the contract because they were promised that they
would play football during the season. 73 The court found no such promise in
the contract, stating "the written scholarship contracts they signed make no
indication of such promises. In fact, the only promises in those written
contracts were that the players would receive money." 74 Despite what the
court held, prospects often believe that all promises made by coaches during
the recruiting process are part of the contract. 75 In order for an athlete to
successfully recover for breach of contract, the athlete "must point to an
64. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
65. Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 944-45.
66. Id. at 942.
67. Id. at 944.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 946-47.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 947.
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identifiable contractual promise that the defendant failed to honor."76 To do
that, the athlete must prove, first, that there was an oral contract and, second,
that the contract was breached.
Oral promises made during the recruiting process are hard to prove. Oral
promises and agreements in contract law are governed by the parol evidence
rule. 77 The parol evidence rule serves to discharge all prior written and oral
agreements that are inconsistent with the final agreement. 78 The NLI is a
standardized agreement and is considered to be final because it contains all the
necessary terms of the contract. 79 In the case of the NLI and financial aid
award, any promises made during the recruiting process are void unless they
are part of the final, written agreement. In plain language, the NLI states that
80
"[n]o additions or deletions may be made."
No promises made by a coach, other than the promise of financial aid, are
included in the final document. 8 1 Although a recruit may believe everything
the coach told him or her during the recruiting process in an attempt to induce
an acceptance, those promises mean almost nothing. The coach is not even a
party to the contract; therefore, any promises of starting or playing are treated
as nothing more than talk about the program. The athlete is left with only a
scholarship. A scholarship may have great value, but when faced with two or
more equivalent scholarships, it is not the only reason the recruit may choose
one institution over another. Without a separate agreement showing the
promises made, the contract will be assumed to be complete, and any evidence
of an oral agreement conflicting with the written one will be dismissed. 82
Under this system, the coach has little incentive to avoid promising the recruit
things he or she may not be able to deliver. Thus, if the recruit does not have
any promises from the coach in writing, heor she has a very little chance of
recovering damages. Because of all the promises made to recruits that cannot
be sustained, this article will next discuss the bargaining power the recruit has.
III. BARGAINING POWER
The prospects have bargaining power when it comes to the recruiting
process only in selecting which school and program they like best. As the NLI

76. Ross, 957 F.2dat417.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
78. Id.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
80. NLI Text, supra note 1.

81. Id.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
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and scholarship awards are standardized forms, there are no terms to be
83
negotiated and no additional conditions to be included in the contract. The
agreement is simply the college or university agreeing to give the recruit a
scholarship and the opportunity to try out for the team in exchange for the
84
student agreeing to enter the school and to participate on an athletic team.
The recruit's only real power is the decision whether or not to accept the offer.
Once the recruit signs the NLI, he or she has no real power against the
institution to enforce the promises made during the recruiting process. The
recruit can, of course, always transfer, but he or she will be hit with a one-year
transfer penalty. 85 This penalty requires an athlete to sit out one year after he
or she transfers to the new institution.
To date, student-athletes have not fared well in their lawsuits against
86
institutions or the NCAA for alleged unkept promises and breach of contract.
Chad Elsey is hoping to change that. Elsey was a student at Southern
Methodist University when he was recruited as a transfer-athlete by thenBaylor coach Dave Bliss. 87 Elsey enrolled at Baylor University in 1999, and
after sitting out for one year because of NCAA rules, he played for Bliss for
two years. 88 The reasons why he transferred are now the subject of a lawsuit
he filed in Texas on January 5, 2004.89 Elsey alleges that while Bliss was
90
recruiting him, Bliss found out that Elsey wanted to go to law school. Elsey's
suit claims that while giving him a tour of campus and showing him the law
school, Bliss said to him "if you commit to me that you will come to Baylor, I
will not only pay for an extra semester, but will pay for law school and any
other degree that you are interested in, so long as you work diligently toward a
83. NLI Text, supra note 1.
84. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
85. DIvISION I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 167, Bylaw 14.5.5.
86. See Hysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 947 (court held that there was no breach of contract when athletes
were removed from the football team because the athletes still received their scholarships); Taylor,
191 S.E.2d at 382 (court found that there was no wrongful termination of the athlete's scholarship
when the student did not remain academically eligible); Jackson, 778 F. Supp. at 1493 (court held
summary judgment for the university because it found that the agreement between the university and
the athlete did not contain a right to play basketball); Ross, 957 F.2d at 415-17 (court found no breach
of contract where athlete claimed breach of promise of quality of education because there was no
identifiable contractual promise that was breached); Conard v. Univ. of Wash., 834 P.2d 17, 26
(Wash. 1992) (breach of contract claim against university was dismissed by court after football
players had scholarships revoked for misconduct).
87. Kevin B. Blackistone, Empty Promises Part of the Game: Elsey-Bliss Tale Should Open
Recruits'Eyes,Odd Lawsuit Notwithstanding,DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004, at 1C.
88. Jeff Miller, Baylor, Bliss Sued by FormerPlayer; Lawyer Says Ex-coach Denies Pledging to
Ease Entrance into Law School, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 9, 2004, at 6.
89. Id.
90. Blackistone, supra note 87.
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degree" 9 1 and that "he had connections at the law school and gaining
admittance for one of his players was 'no problem."' 92 Elsey further alleges
that he inquired about NCAA rules violations and that Bliss contended there
were ways around NCAA rules. 93 Bliss 94 and Baylor University are both
denying Elsey's allegations and that any such promises were made. 95
Elsey subsequently enrolled in law school at the University of Tulsa 96 and
is now suing to recover the costs of tuition and other expenses he says "would
be covered had the contract been performed." 9 7 He realizes that he may have a
hard time with his suit because he had nothing guaranteed in writing.9 8 In
court, it will become a matter of his word against the coach's word; these
promises will be difficult to prove, particularly because the alleged promises
would have constituted a violation of NCAA rules. 99 Without other specific
evidence for Elsey to use in court to show that the alleged promises were an
oral contract, he has little chance of winning his lawsuit. 100 Without such
evidence, the court will look only to the written language of the contract. 10 1
This is the problem that many recruits face after they enter the institution.
While very few of these situations end up in litigation, some college athletes
and parents find themselves disappointed that they based their decision on
promises from a coach or an institution that can be quickly forgotten after the
prospect is signed rather than for the reasons they should have.' 0 2
While Elsey was bound only by the scholarship documents that he signed
and not by an NLI, his recruiting situation is similar to those who have signed
an NLI. 103 Athletes have little recourse if a situation like Fortay's or Elsey's
91. Danny Robbins & Jeff Caplan, Player Says Bliss Was to Pay Tuition, THE FORT-WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 8, 2004, at 1.
92. Tommy Witherspoon, Former Baylor Basketball Player Sues University for Breach of
Contract, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 8, 2004, available at 2004 WL 70370486.
93. Id.

94. Bliss has since resigned from Baylor University for improper payments and benefits given to
players. The university contends that Elsey is trying to take advantage of the scandal surrounding the
murder of another player. See Blackistone, supra note 87; Witherspoon, supra note 92.
95. Witherspoon, supra note 92.
96. Associated Press, Elsey Says Bliss PromisedAidfor Law School, ESPN.COM, Jan. 8, 2004, at

http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=1703371.
97. Witherspoon, supra note 92.
98. Blackistone, supra note 87.
99. DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 100, Bylaw 13.2.
100. SeeHysaw, 690 F. Supp. at 947.
101. Id.
102. Blackistone, supra note 87.
103.

COLLEGIATE

COMMISSIONERS

ASSOCIATION,

FREQUENTLY

ASKED

QUESTIONS,

NATIONAL-LETTER.ORG, at http://www.national-letter.org/faq/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) (stating
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occurs. If promises made by a coach do not come true, the athlete has only a
few viable options, none of which are favorable to the athlete. The first one is
10 4
to remain with the program for the remainder of his or her eligibility.
However, if the athlete relied on a promise such as that the team would be
built around him or her or that he or she would be a starter, staying with the
program is likely undesirable. Second, the athlete can leave school and transfer
to another institution. To do so, the athlete must first complete the current year
at the his or her institution if he or she is still bound under the NLI. 10 5 Then,
the athlete will have to sit out another year after transferring. 10 6 Another
option is to transfer to either a Division II or a Division III institution. For an
athlete looking to play high-level college sports, these divisions will not
provide the same level of competition. If the athlete desires to continue
playing, none of these available options will meet his or her needs.
Without specific evidence of promises or wrongdoing by the coach, very
rarely can coaches be held accountable for what they did. 10 7 What Bliss
allegedly promised Elsey was against NCAA rules. 108 Even if the NCAA finds
there was wrongdoing by the coach, this is not necessarily enough to prove
that there was a contract, and the athlete gets nothing. Instead, the institution
and current or future players will be punished. The sanctions could be loss of
scholarships or ban from post-season play. 109 This will not help Elsey recover
for the promises made by Bliss or hurt Bliss because the scandals surrounding
Baylor render it unlikely he would be offered another coaching job soon.
IV. COACHES MOVING ON; RECRUITS LEFT BEHIND

When Roy Williams left the University of Kansas for the University of
North Carolina following the 2003 NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament, he
left more than just a university behind, he left recruits behind. 1 0 Like the
coach of any major basketball program in the country, Williams had spent
111
much time and effort recruiting prospects to join his successful program.
During the early basketball signing period, Williams was able to sign four
that transfer athletes do not sign an NLI.).
104. This assumes that the institution will renew the athlete's scholarship for the following
academic year.
105. NLI Text, supra note 1.

106. DIviSION I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 167, Bylaw 14.5.5.
107. Blackistone, supra note 87.
108. DMSIoN I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 100, Bylaw 13.2.

109. Id. at 336, Bylaw 19.5.
110. Carol Slezak, Left at the Altar, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at 102.
Ill. Id.
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players to join his team, including two prospects that had been highly recruited
by other institutions around the country) 12 While Williams was able to leave
Kansas for his dream job at North Carolina, the athletes he had recruited were
113
still bound to Kansas by virtue of signing their NLIs.
College basketball is hit particularly hard by this phenomenon because of
the visibility of high-profile recruits1 14 and the early signing period. 115 The
early signing period lasts for one week in November; for the incoming 20042005 class, it lasted from November 12 to November 19, 2003.116 The late
signing period lasted from April 14 to May 19, 2004.117 Most coaching
changes in college basketball do not take place until after the end of the team's
season or the season-ending tournaments. 118 Therefore, recruits who sign
during the early period generally sign without any indication that the coach
will be leaving. Any prospect ,that signs during this period and attempts to
break the NLI and transfer to another school is hit with a penalty of sitting out
for two years and losing two seasons of competition. 1 19 A Qualified Release
Agreement signed by the athlete and the original institution reduces the
20
penalty to sitting out for one year and the loss of one season'of competition. 1
The departure of a coach for any reason is generally not accepted as grounds
for release from an NLI without penalty, but complete waivers have been
granted because the CCA does not want to risk losing a legal challenge.121 The
program is set up to make the recruiting process easier and shorter. It also

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. High-school basketball phenomenons have become big national news. In addition to the
increasing pressure on seniors as to whether they will go pro or go to college, phenomenons are being
followed at younger and younger ages. This can be seen in the hype that has been surrounding
sixteen-year-old O.J. Mayo since he was fourteen and whether or not he will go to college. See Dave
Telep, No Time Like the Present, SI.COM, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.comI/basketball/
college/recruiting/news/2002/10/17/telep/ (Oct. 17, 2002); CNN, Hype Machine Goes Overdrive for
O.J. Mayo, CNN.COM, at http://www.cnn.comITRANSCRIPTS/0212/2l/cst. 11.html (Dec. 21, 2002);
Paul Daugherty, O.J. Mayo: Don't Blame Him for All the Hype, CINCINNATI.COM, at
http://www.cincinnati.com/preps/2003/05/04/wwwprepla4.html (May 4, 2003); Albert Lin, The Next
Big Thing, SICOM, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/college/recruiting/news/2003/
07/09/ABCD/ (July 10, 2003).
115. NLI Signing Dates,supra note 15.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. DMSION I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 251, Bylaw 17.5.4.
119. NLI Text, supra note 1..
120. COLLEGIATE COMMISSIONERS ASSOCIATION, QUALIFIED RELEASE AGREEMENT,
NATIONAL-LETrER.ORG, at http://www.national-letter.org/documents/ReleaseRequest.pdf (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004).
121. Slezak, supranote 110.
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punishes a recruit with loss of eligibility if he or she ends the process early and
subsequently wants to choose another institution because the coach left before
they even enrolled.
The NCAA and the CCA justify this system because of the plain language
in the NLI. 122 Paragraph 19 of the NLI states
I understand I have signed this NLI with the institution and not for a
particular sport or individual. If the coach leaves the institution or the
sports program, I remain bound by the provisions of this NLI. I
understand it is not uncommon for a coach to leave his or her coaching
1 23
position.
However, this provision ignores many realities of big-time college
athletics and that recruits choose an institution in large part for the coach and
the system, not simply because of the academic credentials of the
institution. 124 Many commentators and coaches have commented on the reality
of the prospect choosing an institution because of academics. 125 ESPN's
Digger Phelps has said, "[k]ids choose a school because of the coach,...
[a]nyone who tries to deny that isn't being realistic." 126 In fact, it is hard for
many coaches to argue that recruits are choosing institutions for academics
when only sixteen of the sixty-five teams in the 2004 NCAA Men's Basketball
Tournament retained and graduated fifty percent or more of their freshman
recruits. 127 In addition, sixteen of the teams had a graduation rate of less than
twenty-five percent over four recruiting classes. 12 8 Gene Keady, long-time
head basketball coach at Purdue University, said, "[m]ost kids today sign for
the coach and not the institution. It might not be right. It might not be the
philosophy of the educators, but it's the truth."'129 Roy Williams himself has
said he believes recruits should be released without penalty from their NLIs if
130
the coach leaves.

122. NLI Text, supra note 1.
123. Id
124. See Diprimio, supra note 6.
125. Id.
126. Slezak, supra note 110.
127. Linda Fantin, Sports, Books Tough Mix for Utah Schools; GraduationIssue: Coaches and
Professors Agree That Education Is the Key, but Often That's Not How It Turns Out; Graduation
Numbers Lagfor Athletes, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 18, 2004, at Al.
128. Id.
129. Diprimio, supra note 6.
130. Slezak, supra note 110.
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V. INFORMED DECISIONS?

Part of the process and philosophy behind the recruiting process is to help
prospects to make an informed decision. 131 If a coach leaves an institution, the
current NLI system takes away the recruit's ability to make an informed
decision. Many coaches agree that the prospect is and should be choosing the
institution for academics as much as for athletics. Indiana University coach
Mike Davis said that "[k]ids should pick the school for the right reason and
132
that is that the school offers what you want, academically and athletically."'
In the perfect situation, the prospect would be able to choose the school that
provided the best athletic environment for him or her and the best educational
opportunity. However, as graduation rates for athletes, specifically basketball
and football players, hover around fifty percent and the number of these
underclassmen leaving school for the draft increases, having the best3
13
educational opportunity does not appear to be the number one concern.
While some of the blame for the poor graduation rates rests with athletes and
their lack of dedication to their studies, some of the blame must rest with the
institutions.
In order to be able to choose the environment that is best for them,
prospects need to have all of the information. Part of making an informed
decision is knowing who their coach will be. For all college athletes, the coach
will have a very significant impact on all aspects of their time in college.
During the season, players will spend up to twenty hours a week in practice
and up to eight hours a week practicing during the offseason. 134 The level of
happiness with the program will affect all areas of the athlete's college life.
Therefore, who the coach is will always play a major role in what school the
prospect attends. If the coach who recruited them and with whom they have
built up a relationship leaves, athletes can be negatively impacted in both their
athletic and academic pursuits. The new coach may have completely different
philosophies about how athletes should train and act or place different
priorities on athletics versus academics. Despite this, the athlete is still bound
to the institution and the new coach. If the recruiting process is an attempt to
help the recruit make an informed decision, binding players to a coach they do
not know or have any relationship with takes away this ability.

131. NLI Overview, supra note 3.

132. Diprimio, supra note 6.
133. Fantin, supra note 127.
134. DMsIoN I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 238, Bylaw 17.1.5.
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VI. MAKING THE SYSTEM MoRE EQUITABLE

The system currently in place puts student-athletes at a distinct
disadvantage in comparison to the institution. The institution makes the
decision about whether or not to make the offer of a scholarship. If an athlete
is recruited by and wants to go to a certain university, he or she has little
choice but to sign the NLI. 135 A prospect who does not want to sign the NLI is
left with a much more uncertain future. The coach may interpret the
unwillingness to sign as an indicator that the prospect will not choose that
school and might give that scholarship to another player. 13 6 As one recruit,
Andre Allen, put it, "[i]f you don't sign, it becomes a game of chance. There
are a lot of angles. The coach could give that scholarship to somebody
else." 137 Without the NLI and accompanying scholarship letter, there is no
guarantee for the prospect that he or she will end up with a scholarship at any
school.
The athletes are also not provided enough information about what they are
signing. When an athlete signs an NLI, he or she assumes that everything that
the coach promised will come true and that the coach will be there to make it
all happen. These prospects are young, often with dreams of college and
maybe professional stardom. During the recruiting process, the coach builds
trust with the prospect, and the prospect often does not know any better than to
believe everything the coach promises. Prospects are sent the NLI and a
scholarship letter, but no one is there to provide them with the ability to make
an informed decision or to help separate the big talk and built-up promises of
the coaches from what the athlete is actually contracting for when the letter is
signed. The plain text of the NLI is easy to comprehend, but prospects are
lacking information on what is not included. 138 The NCAA Guide for the
College-Bound Student-Athlete provides minimal information to prospects
about the NLI process. 139 The guide gives the signing dates for the NLI and
directs all questions to the NLI office. 140 Likewise, the NCAA's "Frequently
Asked Questions" on its website provides no additional information about

135. The NLI program is technically a voluntary program, as neither the prospect nor the
institution is required to participate. See NLI History,supra note 7.
136. Diprimio, supra note 6.
137. Id.
138. NLI Text, supra note 1.
139. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsSOCIATION, 2002-2003 GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGEBOUND STUDENT-ATHLETE: NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT, NCAA.ORG, at http://www.ncaa.org/
eligibility/cbsa/letterofintent.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Student-athlete Guide].

140. Id.
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14
promises and the recruiting process. 1
While not without problems, the NLI system does provide the recruiting
process with important benefits. The signing of a NLI by a recruit stops the
142
recruiting process, which is good for both the institution and the prospect.
The purpose of the NLI is to provide certainty in the recruiting process, as well
and expense for the institution and limit recruiting
as to reduce recruiting time
43
pressure for the player. 1

Institutions spend large amounts of money during the recruiting process
both in bringing prospects in to visit campus and in sending coaches out on
scouting and recruiting visits. The signing of an NLI allows the institution to
save time and money because the recruiting process ends earlier and binds the
prospect to one of its available scholarships. It also prevents an institution
from trying to recruit an athlete away from another institution. 144 Once the
athlete signs the NLI, he or she will have to sit out for two years and lose two
145
seasons of competition if he or she breaks it.
Making a decision allows the recruit to refocus on finishing his or her high
school career and preparing for college. For the athlete, the recruiting process
can be lengthy and can create a lot of pressure on the athlete to choose an
institution, particularly on high-profile recruits. 14 6 While many would consider
being offered college scholarships from several institutions to be a perk rather
than a problem, the recruiting process puts a lot of pressure on someone who is
only seventeen or eighteen years old. One highly-touted recruit, Malik
Hairston of Detroit, said, "[s]ometimes it gets to be a little too much... but
even when it is, I have to suck it up and take it. You have to take the bitter
with the sweet."1 4 7 The purpose of the NLI system is important to both the
athlete and the institution, but in order to work properly, the system requires
some changes to keep up with changing college athletics.
Changing the system will make it more equitable and still maintain the
purpose and most of the advantages of the NLI system. The NLI website lists
what it considers to be the advantages to the prospect and the institution.
Once a National Letter of Intent is signed, prospective student-athletes are
LETTER
OF
FREQUENTLY-ASKED
QUESTIONS
ON
THE NATIONAL
141. NCAA,
INTENT/FINANCIAL AID, NCAA.ORG, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membershipsvcs/
eligibility-recruiting/faqs/nli-financialaid.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter NCAA
Eligibility FAQ].
142. NLI Text, supra note 1.
143. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
144. NLI Text, supra note 1.
145. Id.
146. See Diprimio, supra note 6.
147. Id.
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no longer subject to further recruiting contacts and calls.
Student-athletes are assured of an athletics scholarship for one full
academic year. (If not for the National Letter of Intent program, a student
could find his or her scholarship taken by a more highly recruited student only
weeks or days before classes begin.)
Institutions can be certain that once the student-athlete has signed a Letter
of Intent, there is no need to continue recruiting for that position. (Without the
program, last-minute changes by student-athletes could open scholarships and
positions on teams.)
By emphasizing student-athletes' commitments to educational institutions,
not particular coaches or teams, the program focuses university athletics on
educational objectives. The program promotes student-athletes' academic
48
objectives and helps to sustain the amateur nature of college sports. 1
These advantages are very important to the recruiting process. Therefore,
the process would be better served by a reformed NLI system that makes the
system more equitable than by continuing with the current system or scrapping
it completely.
A. Administration.:
One of the problems with the NLI is that it is administered by the CCA
through the SEC, rather than by the NCAA. 149 Bill Saum, an NCAA official,
has said, "[w]e have nothing to do with the national letter of intent ...As far
150
as whether or not an athlete should sign, he has to do what is best for him."'
This approach taken by the NCAA does not adequately address the needs of
the recruiting process. With fifty-six conferences participating in the NLI
program, the vast majority of college recruits receiving athletic financial aid
go through the NLI system. 15 1 Therefore, the NCAA needs to take more
accountability for the process.
The NCAA Guide for the College-Bound Student-Athlete provides little
information on the NLI other than signing period dates and a link to the
website for the NLI. 152 This guide should be modified to tell prospects exactly
what they are and are not agreeing to when they sign the NLI and what is not
being promised to them. Likewise, more information can be given in the

148. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
149. NLI History, supra note 7.
150. See Diprimio, supra note 6 (Saum is the Director of Agent, Gambling and Amateurism
Activities).
151. NLI Conferences, supra note 5.
152. Student-athlete Guide, supranote 139.
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"Frequently-Asked Questions" section of the NCAA website dealing with the
NLI.153 The NLI website also gives no information on what promises can be
enforced and what promises cannot.1 54 Despite this, the NCAA punishes the
athlete with the loss of one or two seasons of eligibility for transferring to an
environment he or she believes will better suit them or for breaking the
NLI. 155 If athletes are to be punished under NCAA rules, then the NCAA has
an obligation to administer the program or, at the very least, to oversee it.
Having the NLI system administered by the NCAA will provide several
benefits. First, there will be only one place the prospect has to go to get all the
information, not two. The rest of the recruiting process, including the InitialEligibility Clearinghouse, is run by the NCAA. 156 Prospects go to the NCAA
for information regarding the recruiting process, which is why the NCAA puts
together a guide for them. 157 The recruiting process can be stressful and
confusing enough. By running the program through the NCAA, the prospect
will have an easier time navigating the recruiting process and the rules
regarding it. The NCAA is also in a better position to provide additional
information to the prospects. The NCAA is looked to by prospects and parents
to provide all the information concerning the recruiting process, what can and
cannot be done during the recruiting process, and what promises can be
enforced. Currently, the information available is not sufficient. Finally, by
administering the program itself, the NCAA will achieve greater consistency
with the rules. If the recruit is going to be punished for NCAA rules violations,
the NCAA should not be taking such a hands-off approach.
B. Revising the Contract
The text of the NLI also needs to be revised. The current standard form
does not allow institutions and athletes to bargain, make changes, or adapt it to
their needs. If the prospect is contracting with the institution, he or she should
be allowed to truly bargain during the recruiting process. While institutions
would not necessarily benefit from a bargained-for contract, it would make the
system more equitable. The prospect and the institution should be allowed to
enter into additional contracts for promises made during the process. No

153. NCAA EligibilityFAQ, supra note 141.
154. NLI Text, supra note 1.
155. See NLI Text, supra note 1.
156. All recruits must go through the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse to certify that they
have met the requirements and are eligible for NCAA athletics. See NCAA, NCAA Initial-Eligibility
Clearinghouse, NCAA.ORG, at http://www.ncaa.org/mailbox/clearinghouse.html (last visited Nov.
23, 2004).
157. Student-athlete Guide, supra note 139.
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contracts could be entered into for additional financial benefits or for those
things that would be violations of NCAA rules. 158 If a coach recruits a player
by promising that he or she will get four years, be a starting player, or play so
many minutes a game, then the player should be able to get that in writing.
Once the promises are in writing, it will be easier for the athlete to enforce
them. This will hopefully induce coaches not to make promises such as these
because they generate the possibility of the creation of multi-year contracts,
instead of the current one-year NLI.
Admittedly, several problems would exist with this system. Coaches
would be making contracts with players having no idea how the athlete will
play in college. Athletes will also not be on an equal footing with one another
and not have equal opportunity to compete for positions, playing time, or
opportunities. The recruiting process could become more complicated with
prospects bargaining over items such as playing time, positions, and their
position on the depth chart or a multitude of other options. However, none of
these problems would exist if the coach does not make the promises. The
system will work much better if coaches do not make the kinds of promises
that they cannot follow through on, whether they are like Erickson and make
on-the-field promises 59 or like Bliss and make promises that would violate
NCAA rules. 160 If it does not work out to their satisfaction, the coach or
institution can break these promises, but the athlete would then be able to
recover for damages.
C. Allowing the Athlete Out When the Coach Leaves
By binding an incoming student-athlete to the NLI and the institution
when a coach leaves, the system is being unfair to the interests of both the
student and the incoming coach. Most of the top high school basketball players
sign their NLI during the early signing period in November. 16 1 Meanwhile,
most basketball coaches do not get fired, resign, or announce their retirement
until after their season ends, usually in March. 162 The student is bound to a
program that might not be the best fit for their skills and talents. The incoming
coach is bound to a recruiting class he or she did not recruit. Every coach has
his or her own style or philosophy of how to best run a program. The prospects
158. DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 54, at 100, Bylaw 13.2.
159. Fortay, 1994 WL 62319, at *3-4.
160. See Blackistone, supra note 87.
161. NLI Signing Dates, supra note 15.
162. The 2004 NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament ended on April 5, 2004. NCAA Sports,
Men's Basketball: Division I Scoreboard, NCAASPORTS.COM, at http://www.ncaasports.com/
basketball/mens/scoreboard/madness/20040405 (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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signed to an NLI by the coach's predecessor might not fit well into the new
coach's philosophy. Requiring enforcement against a recruit of an NLI when
the coach leaves might force the recruit into a program that is not beneficial to
him or her or might force a coach to try to fit a player in that is not right for
the new system.
To correct this situation, all incoming recruits should be allowed a limited
release from their contractual obligations, without penalty, if the head coach
that recruited them leaves the university. Any recruit who has signed with an
institution and the coach subsequently leaves the institution before the athlete
enrolls should not be bound by the NLI. However, this release from obligation
will be limited. The recruit should be given thirty days from the end of the
coach's tenure to sign an NLI with a new institution. These athletes then would
be allowed to sign a new NLI out of the designated signing periods. Because
of its superior bargaining position, the original institution would be bound by
the NLI and financial aid offer given to the recruit. Therefore, the revised
paragraph 19 of the NLI should say
I understand I have signed this NLI with the institution and not for a
particular sport or individual. If the coach leaves the institution or the sports
program before I enroll at the institution, I will be given 30 days from the time
the coach is fired, resigns, or retires. During those 30 days, I will be allowed to
be recruited by other institutions and to sign a new Letter of Intent, without
bound to the institution
penalty. If I do not do so within 30 days, I will remain
163
with whom I signed my original Letter of Intent.
The prospect will have only thirty days to keep the recruiting period short,
thus saving recruiting institutions from spending too much additional money
and from putting too much additional pressure on prospects. This period will
allow the new coach at the institution to have an opportunity to talk to the
players and. attempt to keep them. This system will still present the same
advantages as the old system while presenting new ones. 164 The short time
frame allows the prospect to keep the recruiting process at a minimum, but
gives the recruit the opportunity to evaluate his or her situation. Once the
prospect signs a new NLI, the recruiting process will once again cease. Once a
new NLI is signed, the prospect will still be assured of an athletics scholarship
for one year, and the institution will have the student bound by contract. This
revised system will allow the prospect to choose the best athletic and
educational environment.
Allowing recruits to be released will allow them the freedom to make an
informed choice. When the athlete first committed to the university, a variety
163. Compare with NLI Text, supra note 1.
164. NLI Overview, supra note 3.
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of factors might have weighed in the decision. Prospects might choose an
institution because of its location, the storied history of the program, the
coach's success in grooming players for professional leagues, the style of play,
or even because of the institution itself. With the recruiting coach no longer at
the institution, some of these factors might no longer exist. If Fortay had been
permitted to leave Miami as he initially requested when Dennis Erickson took
over as coach, perhaps he would have ended up at a school that was a better fit
for him and three years of litigation would have been avoided. 165 A prospect
should be given the opportunity to make the same kind of informed decision
that he or she did when the NLI was first signed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the Brian Fortay and Chad Elsey situations and Roy Williams's
departure from Kansas demonstrate, the current NLI system is not fair to
recruits. Unequal bargaining power exists in the relationship between recruits
and the universities recruiting them. High-profile college football coaching
departures have already been announced for the 2005 season at Illinois,
Florida, and South Carolina. 166 These changes are just some of the latest in the
revolving door of the college coaching ranks. With the unequal bargaining
power and continuous changing of coaches, players will continue to encounter
situations of unfulfilled promises and play for a different coach than the one
that recruited them.
This comment proposed changes to the current NLI system. These
changes would improve the system and help equalize the balance of power in
the recruiting process. While these changes may not make the system perfect,
the changes may have avoided Fortay being promised playing opportunities
without any guarantees behind them, Elsey being promised things that would
violate NCAA rules, and the players newly recruited by Williams being bound
to the new coach. Implementing these changes in the NLI system would allow
future recruits to avoid these situations and to make truly informed decisions.
Stacey Meyer

165. Fortay, 1994 WL 62319, at *4.
166. ESPN, Division I-A Coaching Changes, ESPN.COM, at http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=1925368 (Nov. 23, 2004) (Ron Turner and Ron Zook have both been fired from
Illinois and Florida, respectively, and Steve Spurrier will replace Lou Holtz at South Carolina.).

